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Abstract I argue that given the persistent injustice present within the Prison In-
dustrial Complex in the United States, many incarcerated individuals would be jus-
tiοed in attempting to escape and that these prison breaks may qualify as acts of
civil disobedience. After an introduction in section one, section two offers a cri-
tique of the classical liberal conception of civil disobedience envisioned by John
Rawls. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that acts of civil disobedience can involve both
violence and evasion of punishment, both of which are necessary components of
prison breaks. In section three I outline the broad circumstances in which escape at-
temptswouldbe justiοed, which arewhen individuals have either been incarcerated
on unjust grounds (such as coercive plea bargains, draconian laws, or institutional-
ized discrimination) or when individuals are subject to inhumane conditions within
prison (such as physical or sexual abuse, inadequate medical care, and overcrowd-
ing). Although this framework is formulated with the U.S. criminal justice system in
mind, it is potentially applicable to other instances of incarceration if they’re simi-
larly unjust such as prisons in other countries, migrant detention centers, or psychi-
atric wards. I then outline four requirements which must be met for these prison
breaks to qualify as civil disobedience. First, escape must be attempted as a last
resort. Second, violence and other law-breaking must be reasonable, meaning it is
done with precision, discretion, and proportion. Third, escapees hold the burden
of proving they have been subject to injustice. Fourth and οnally, the act of escape
must contain other key components of civil disobedience such as persuasion, com-
munication, and publicity, which will most likely be accomplished via coordination
with non-incarcerated individuals. In section four I address the distinction between
prison reform and abolition.
*Isaac Shur is a senior atNortheasternUniversity in Boston,MassachuseĴswhere he studies Politics,
Philosophy, and Economics. After graduating he plans on pursuing a PhD in philosophy, with the goal
of becoming a professor. His main areas of interest are social, political, and moral philosophy. Outside
of philosophy, Isaac enjoys music, literature, and theatre. He is also the vice president and treasurer of
Northeastern’s Shakespeare Society, with which he typically performs every semester.
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1 Introduction
Prison breaks are generally not considered acceptable, that much is obvious. Conven-
tionalwisdom leads us to believe that people in prison deserve to be there due to crimes
they’ve commiĴed, and should be kept there to prevent them from commiĴing more
crimes. But this is not necessarily the case. Many innocent people are strong armed
into pleading guilty by prosecutors, since plea bargains eliminate the risk of receiv-
ing an even harsher sentence during trial.1 Additionally, many people are imprisoned
based on laws thatmay qualify as unjust, such as non violent drug oěenses or sexwork
oěenses involving consenting parties. It is clear that grave injustice occurs within the
criminal justice system, and more specięcally the Prison Industrial Complex.2 My aim
is not to prove this, as this has been thoroughly argued elsewhere by the likes of John
Pfaě, Angela Davis, and Michelle Alexander.3 Rather I argue that in the face of these
injustices, incarcerated individuals may be justięed in aĴempting to escape prison and
subsequently evade reimprisonment, and that such conduct may qualify as civil dis-
obedience.
This might seem radical and surprising at ęrst since prison breaks are inherently a
violent form of evading punishment, whereas civil disobedience is often understood to
be neither violent nor evasive. It is for this reason that section two oěers a critique of the
classical liberal conception of civil disobedience envisioned by JohnRawls. Contrary to
Rawls, I argue that acts of civil disobedience can involve both violence and evasion of
punishment. In section three I outline the appropriate circumstances and requirements
which qualify certain escape aĴempts as justięed acts of civil disobedience. In section
four I address the distinction between prison reform and abolition.
1. John Pfaě argues that the power of prosecutors is actually the primary cause of increased prison
populations. See John Pfaě, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—and How to Achieve Real
Reform (2017).
2. The term Prison Industrial Complex refers to the ever expanding overlapping ęnancial interests
of state punishment and private industry, such as the many government contracts given to CoreCivic
(formerly known as the Corrections Corporation of America or CCA) to build and maintain private
prisons.
3. Angela Davis,Are Prisons Obsolete? (Seven Stories Press, 2003); Pfaě, Locked In; Michelle Alexander
and Cornel West, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (The New Press, 2010).
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2 Violence and evasion in civil disobedience: a cri-
tique of the liberal conception
Although arguments in favor of violent civil disobedience have been given,4 nonvio-
lence is still assumed to be a part of the very deęnition of civil disobedience in much
contemporary analysis.5 This is no doubt due in large part to John Rawls’ deęnition of
civil disobedience stated in A Theory of Justice. For Rawls, civil disobedience must be
“a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with
the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.”6 Rawls
also thought that when practicing civil disobedience, ędelity to the law is expressed
“by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.”7 Clearly any
form of resistance that involves violence or the evasion of punishment will not qualify
as civil disobedience under Rawls’ framework.8 This certainly sounds like the intuitive
conception of civil disobedience that we associate with ęgures such as Martin Luther
King Jr. or Mahatma Gandhi. But this conception has its critics, and some even ques-
tion whether or not it truly matches up with the actions of King and Gandhi.9 Pushing
back on this traditional conception, contemporary philosophers have oěered alterna-
tive conceptions of civil disobedience that allow for both evasion of punishment and
the use of violence.10 A defense of these frameworks will lay the necessary ground-
work for this project.
4. AllanC.Hutchinson, “Civil Disobedience: Its Logic andLanguage,”The LawTeacher 13, no. 1 (1979):
1–11; John Morreall, “The Justięability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6,
no. 1 (1976): 35–47; Robin Celikates, “Rethinking Civil Disobedience as a Practice of Contestation—
Beyond the Liberal Paradigm,” Constellations 23, no. 1 (2016): 37–45.
5. See for instance William Smith, “Policing Civil Disobedience,” Political Studies 60, no. 4 (2012):
826–42. Smith’s project of determining how to police civil disobedience would obviously require drastic
changes if the disobedience in question were to be violent.
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971; repr., Harvard University Press, 2005), 364.
7. Ibid.
8. Under a strict Rawlsian framework, violent and evasive resistancemay instead qualify as “militant
action” (see ibid., 367–68). Some prison breaks may indeed qualify as militant action, but those which
meet the requirements laid out in section three will be beĴer classięed as civil disobedience, due to the
restrictions set on the use of violence and the element of persuasion that is required.
9. Candice Delmas, A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil (New York, USA: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
10. Celikates, “RethinkingCivil Disobedience,” 37–45; Kimberley Brownlee,Conscience and Conviction:
The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford University Press, 2012). Celikates’ and Brownlee’s conceptions
diverge from Delmas’ in an important way. While Celikates and Brownlee argue civil disobedience
itself can be violent, Delmas argues for a distinction between civil and uncivil disobedience that are both
potentially defensible as principled disobedience. I believe this distinction has merit but for the sake of
simplicity and focus I’ll use the more popular term civil disobedience inclusively as per Celikates and
Brownlee.
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2.1 Evasion of punishment
I’ll start with the evasion of punishment,11 which becomes paradoxical in the case of
mass incarceration, where the punishment itself is identięed as unjust and in need of
change. Philosophers such as Kimberley Brownlee and Howard Zinn point this out as
well.12 Brownlee argues that accepting the legal consequences of one’s actions neces-
sarily concedes the legitimacy of the punishment.13 Therefore it would be impossible
to both accept a given punishment (thus granting it legitimacy) while also protesting
against said instance of punishment as unjust via civil disobedience, as this would lead
to the conclusion that the punishment is unjust yet somehow legitimate. This is a puz-
zling conclusion at best, and a logical contradiction as worst. Surely in order for the
criminal justice system tomaintain legitimacy itmust promote justice rather than injus-
tice. It cannot be both unjust and legitimate, at least not without reducing legitimacy
to moral arbitrariness. Furthermore, as Zinn points out, civil disobedience necessarily
begins with the premise that the law must sometimes be disobeyed.14 So why should
obedience suddenly be required once we get to the punishment stage of the legal pro-
cess? If disobedience is justięed at the outset it seems arbitrary, even backwards, to
reinstate a requirement of obedience later on. It would be more consistent and sensi-
ble for disobedience to remain justięable throughout the entire process, punishment
and all.
Rather than willingly accepting the legal consequences of their actions, Zinn and
Brownlee argue citizens need only accept the risk of being legally punished.15 There
are two advantages to replacing the acceptance of punishment with the acceptance of
risk. First, accepting the risk of punishment rather than the punishment itself avoids
the contradiction of granting legitimacy to instances of injustice. Accepting the risk of
being imprisoned merely acknowledges the state’s ability to incarcerate but grants no
legitimacy to such incarceration, thus leaving open the possibility that such practices
of incarceration are unjust. Second, acceptance of risk rather than punishment allows
citizens to sustain their disobedience, thus maintaining consistency, rather than arbi-
trarily rescinding their disobedience when it comes time for punishment. This makes
civilly disobedient prison breaks more immediately plausible, as surely anyone who
aĴempts to escape from prison must accept the risk of punishment. It also demon-
strates that the idea of evasive civil disobedience is not as new and radical as one may
assume.
Some object by invoking Martin Luther King Jr.’s assertion that those who dis-
11. Some theorists, such as Brownlee, distinguish between evasion in general, and evasion of state
punishment specięcally. Throughout this piece I will use ‘evasion’ to refer exclusively to the laĴer sense.
12. Howard Zinn, “Law, Justice, and Disobedience,”Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy
5, no. 4 (1991): 899–920; Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction.
13. Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, 8, 23.
14. Zinn, “Law, Justice, and Disobedience,” 914.
15. Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, 146–47; Zinn, “Law, Justice, and Disobedience,” 913–15.
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obey the law and subsequently accept their penalty demonstrate “the highest respect
for law.”16 But Zinn argues that King’s motivation for accepting punishment was
grounded instrumentally rather than in principle.17 King speaks of one “whowillingly
accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the commu-
nity over its injustice.”18 Interpreting King’s words strictly, we might come to the
conclusion that one must only accept imprisonment insofar as this appeals to the com-
munity’s conscience. Even King himself did not always accept punishment in full, for
instance when he accepted premature release from jail in 1960 after an anonymous
benefactor pleaded his case from behind the scenes.19 Although this premature release
was extralegal rather than illegal, it shows that King was willing to serve less time
than he was sentenced to. Based on this, and a strict reading of his leĴer, I’d argue
that King understood that imprisonment had a limited communicative purpose, and
once this upper limit was reached he knew he would be able to aěect more change
from the outside than in. Important and well known ęgures like King might accept
temporary imprisonment for instrumental purposes, but the American conscience seems
particularly unmoved by mass incarceration of regular citizens since prison popula-
tions continue to rise while conditions deteriorate. Thus, ordinary people stuck in
the unjust Prison Industrial Complex need not accept imprisonment by King’s own
logic. They will be beĴer able to arouse the community’s conscience if they evade, as
I’ll argue later on. Even still, one might maintain the view that disobedients should
express ędelity to the law, thus departing from the interpretation of King I’ve argued
for here. In the face of such a view I ask: why should citizens respect the law when the
law so clearly disrespects citizens by inĚicting injustice upon them? Respect between
citizens and the systems which govern them should be mutual, not one sided. Further,
the refusal to accept such injustice should be seen as expressing ędelity to the ideal of
a just system in the face of an unjust one.
2.2 Violence
Violence is a more diĜcult component to analyze due to the question of what exactly
qualięes as violence. John Morreall argues that if we interpret violence as stripping
someone of value, integrity, dignity, sacredness, or their rights to body, autonomy,
and private property then we clearly cannot limit the term violence to obvious physi-
cal acts butmust extend it to psychological harm, verbal acts, and coercion in general.20
Similarly and more recently, Robin Celikates distinguishes between a narrow under-
standing of violence as strictly physical harm to people, and a broad understanding
16. Martin Luther King Jr., “LeĴer from a Birmingham Jail,” 1963, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/
Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
17. Zinn, “Law, Justice, and Disobedience,” 915–16.
18. King Jr., “LeĴer from a Birmingham Jail.” Emphasis mine.
19. Zinn, “Law, Justice, and Disobedience,” 915.
20. Morreall, “The Justięability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” 37–45.
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that is closer to Morreall’s view which includes things like destruction of property, vi-
olence to one’s self, and psychological violence.21 Both Morreall and Celikates argue
that taking the broad view of violence forces us to drop the requirement of nonviolence
in civil disobedience, or else admit that many actions which we generally consider to
be civilly disobedient will no longer qualify as such. For instance, blocking entrances
to buildings in protest.22 Such an act, after all, involves physically challenging the au-
tonomy of those who wish to enter and exit the building. Ultimately this challenge to
autonomy is a use of force which, asMorreall puts it, “hasmuchmore in commonwith
a physically violent protest than with a leĴer-writing campaign.”23
On the other hand, if we take the narrow view of violence for the sake of maintain-
ing the nonviolence requirement then we lose powerful tools which could potentially
change the status quo and reduce overall suěering. As Celikates argues, the require-
ment of nonviolence threatens to reduce civil disobedience to a purely symbolic moral
claim with no potential to aěect any real change on political systems.24 As we’ll see
in the next section, this is certainly the case regarding prisoners’ ability to reform the
system from the inside. In other words, nonviolence can place drastic restrictions on
both the options available for civil disobedients and the eěectiveness of those options.
So, the requirement should be dropped, and some degree of violence should be per-
missible.25
More important than the distinction between violence or nonviolence, Morreall ar-
gues, is the distinction between coercion and persuasion, where persuasion is an at-
tempt to change one’s mind while coercion is an aĴempt to change one’s behavior
using force or the threat of force.26 In other words, the persuader aĴempts to align the
persuadee’s views with their own, while the coercer ignores the coercee’s views en-
tirely. Acts of protest and resistance might necessarily be somewhat coercive in some
contexts, but this need not disqualify them as civil disobedience as long as the ele-
ment of persuasion is still present to a suĜcient degree. An action that is wholly co-
ercive and not at all persuasive won’t qualify as civil disobedience. So in order for
prison breaks to qualify, the violence exhibited will need to strike a balance between
coercion and persuasion. This brings me to the next stage of this project. Surely not
all prison breaks will maintain a suĜcient balance between persuasion and coercion.
Some prison breaks will be justięed acts of civil disobedience, and others will not.
21. Celikates, “Rethinking Civil Disobedience,” 41–42.
22. Morreall, “The Justięability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” 39–41.
23. Ibid., 40.
24. Celikates, “Rethinking Civil Disobedience,” 41–43.
25. This conclusion is shared by Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, 21–23 as well.
26. Morreall, “The Justięability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” 40–43.
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3 Prison breaks as civil disobedience
It is one thing to morally justify prison breaks, it is another thing to classify them as
acts of civil disobedience. Acts which qualify as civil disobedience may nevertheless
be morally unjustięed (bigots might peacefully protest against laws which prohibit
discrimination in the workplace, for instance). As such, the tasks of justięcation and
classięcation must be undergone separately.
3.1 Justiοcation
I argue that there are two broad circumstances in which escaping prison would be
morally justięed. Either the sentence is objectionable due to procedural injustices that
it resulted from, or the incarcerated individual faces such grave and persistent injustice
within the prison itself that they fear for their health and safety. A prison sentence itself
might be objectionable in a number of ways: if the individual was coerced to plead
guilty by a prosecutor; if they were coerced into the crime yet sentenced anyways;
if they’ve been given a disproportionate sentence due to characteristics such as race,
religion, or gender; if they’ve been incarcerated based on the violation of unjust laws,27
including laws criminalizing consensual and victimless acts (here following the liberal
commitment against paternalism); or if the crime was commiĴed in order to preserve
their health and safety or that of others (such as economic crime to avoid starvation, or
providing sanctuary to undocumented migrants). For injustice within the prison itself
to qualify as a threat to one’s health and safety we might turn to instances of physical
and sexual assault, excessive use of solitary conęnement, and prison overcrowding,
which are all too common in the U.S. incarceration system.28
27. This raises the obvious question of what makes a law unjust, an important question too compli-
cated to answer suĜciently here. Yet I submit that we can conceive of unjust laws and point to past
instances of them such as fugitive slave laws. Other cases are less clear. I for one believe that nonviolent
drug consumers and consensual sex workers are imprisoned on the basis of unjust laws.
28. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, 77-83; American Civil Liberties Union, “The Dangerous Overuse of
Solitary Conęnement in the United States,” 2014, https://www.aclu.org/report/dangerous-ove
ruse-solitary-confinement-united-states; American Civil Liberties Union, “Overcrowding and
Overuse of Imprisonment in theUnited States,” 2015, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Rul
eOfLaw/OverIncarceration/ACLU.pdf. According to American Civil Liberties Union, “Overcrowding
and Overuse...,” U.S. prison populations have risen 700% since 1970, which has outpaced both general
population growth and crime rates. Most facilities are far beyond capacity “with prisoners sleeping in
gyms and hallways or triple- and quadruple-bunked in cells.” This is the sort of overcrowding which
justięes escape.
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3.2 Classiοcation
Beyond these broad circumstances there are additional requirements which need to be
met by escapees for their aĴempts to be classięed as civil disobedience. For a more
detailed framework of justięed violence, I turn to Allan C. Hutchinson, who gives four
qualięcationswhichmust bemet for violence to be justięed in civil disobedience. First,
it must be used as a last resort (this is reminiscent of Rawls’ stipulation29 that any form
of civil disobediencemust occur after all available legal channels have been exhausted).
Second, the violence must be a proportional response to a serious violation of rights.
Third, the burden of proof regarding the aforementioned violation of rights is on those
who commit and advocate for the violence. Finally, violence must be used with pre-
cision and discretion.30 Beyond Hutchinson’s requirements, escapees must also meet
Morreall’s requirement of persuasion identięed earlier. I’ve combined and distilled
Hutchinson’s andMorreall’s frameworks into four points, which can be used to evalu-
ate escape aĴempts on a case by case basis to determine whether they can be classięed
as civil disobedience.
3.2.1 Escape as a last resort
The sheer fact that an individual has ended up in prisonmeans they have gone through
the available legal channels already, and often faced injustices such as coercion into
plea deals. There are few channels available within prisons themselves to remedy in-
justice. Congress has continually passed legislation making litigation against prisons
diĜcult if not impossible, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 which re-
quires inmates to exhaust internal remedies before being eligible for lawsuits. But these
internal remedies are designed by prison administrations to be overly complex and ul-
timately useless. Take for instance the 602 formwhichCalifornia prisoners are required
to ęll out to begin the internal grievance process. These forms have a notorious rep-
utation among prisoners for being lost, ignored, and even burned by guards in front
of inmates, who are then left with no other channels for recourse.31 The end result is
that prisoners are stiĚed during the internal process, which then blocks them from ac-
cessing the courts.32 Additionally, prison guards who might theoretically be capable
of remedying injustices are often commiĴing the injustices in the ęrst place or at least
turning a blind eye to them.33 Thus it is not diĜcult to argue that prisoners facing injus-
29. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 363–68.
30. Hutchinson, “Civil Disobedience,” 1–11.
31. KiĴy Calavita, Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law, 2nd ed. (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2010), 47–50.
32. Ibid.
33. See for instance David Sonestein, “California Prisoners Say Videos Show ‘Gladiator Fights’ At
Soledad State Prison,” Shadow Proof, 2019, https://shadowproof.com/2019/02/18/california-
prisoners - say - videos - show - gladiator - fights - at - soledad - state - prison/; Jason Renard
Walker, “Grey Suit Protection: Ellis Unit Guards Admit Assaulting Prisoners, But Aren’t Held Account-
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tice in the mass incarceration system have exhausted their legal channels, which were
limited in the ęrst place.
Extralegal channels which lack violence and evasion have also proven ineěective in
prisons. Past acts of disobedience such as hunger strikes and work stoppages have left
prisoner’s demands unmet.34 This is due largely to the position of power that correc-
tional authorities wield over those who aĴempt to strike. Themost recent prison strike
in 2018 was met with harsh preemptive suppression from prison authorities, such as
the transfer and isolation of prisoner activists and jailhouse lawyers under false pre-
tenses.35 Even violent (yet non evasive) tactics have failed in the past such as the 1971
AĴica revolt, which resulted in the death or injury of 112 inmates and left their de-
mands unmet.36 This is not to say that prisoners must aĴempt all of the methods of
resistance mentioned here before aĴempting escape, rather I argue that given the inef-
fectiveness of these methods escape aĴempts may be the only viable option prisoners
have in the ęrst place.
3.2.2 Reasonable violence
I ęnd Hutchinson’s second and fourth requirements similar enough to lump them to-
gether as one requirement; that the violence used to escape and evade must be reason-
able. This means it must be proportionate to the violence they are subject to, and it
must be used with precision and discretion. Escapees should avoid direct confronta-
tion with correctional oĜcers and law enforcement as best they can, only engaging in
physical violence when they are subject to physical violence themselves. Preventative
and retaliatory violence would not be permiĴed. Violence against civilians should be
avoided altogether unless zealous private citizens aĴempt to directly pursue and de-
tain escapees, in which case they have in essence ęlled the role of law enforcement.
Then the same principles of proportionality, precision, and discretion apply. Escapees
will no doubt be forced to break other laws while evading capture. This additional law
breaking must follow the same rule as violence and be proportionate to the escapees’
needs and similarly precise so as to minimize harm to others. Stealing small amounts
of food or money, and perhaps transportation (be it vehicle theft or not paying for
public transit) would be justięed.
able,” Incarcerated Workers Organizing CommiĴee, 2019, https://incarceratedworkers.org/news/
grey - suit - protection - ellis - unit - guards - admit - assaulting - prisoners - arent - held -
accountable.
34. Delmas, A Duty to Resist, 183–84.
35. Paul Stanley Holdorf and Melinda R. Paterson, “Prisoners’ Legal Advocacy Network (PLAN)
Mounts Legal Responses to Widespread Reports of Prisoner Abuses in the Aftermath of the 2018 Na-
tional Prison Strike,” 2018, https://www.nlg.org/plan-prison-strike-response-2018/.
36. Delmas, A Duty to Resist, 180–83.
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3.2.3 Burden of proof
Injustice within the Prison Industrial Complex is well documented, and often self ev-
ident. For instance, physical abuse perpetrated by correctional oĜcers and other in-
mates is likely to leave visible traces on the body. Unjust conditions such as overcrowd-
ing and the use of solitary conęnement aremaĴers of public record.37 In sum, the same
instances of injustice which ground prison breaks as a potential form of civil disobedi-
ence also serve as the proof which fulęlls this third requirement. The main obstacle in
proving instances of injustice would likely be state action. Authorities might destroy
and delete damning records or aĴempt to cover-up instances of violence and abuse.
It is likely that blame would be shifted from oĜcials to inmates themselves, as was
the case with the most 2018 prison strike.38 The diĜculty in proving injustice will vary
greatly from case to case. Sometimes it will be obvious but there will often be baĴles in
the court of both law and public opinion. Overcoming state interference in providing
proof of injustice will likely require collaboration between people inside and outside
of prisons, which is addressed in the next section.
3.2.4 Persuasion
The requirement of persuasion intertwines naturally with three other important com-
ponents of civil disobedience: publicity, communication, and collaboration. I argue
that escapees can account for all four of these components in the same way. Escaped
convicts naturally have incentive to hide from the public eye while the police have in-
centive to publicize the escape in order to raise awareness of potential danger aswell as
procure tips from the public. However I believe it is sensible to require publicity that is
intentional on behalf of the escapee, if for no other reason than to also fulęll persuasion
through communication to the public. Escapees could communicate by disseminating
their stories through collaborators on the outsidewho are capable of being in the public
eyemore directly such as family and friends or perhaps sympathetic journalists. These
collaborators will also be paramount in providing proof of injustice. While escapees
will likely be occupied primarilywith evading authorities, allies such as journalists and
activists can investigate claims of abuse, violence, and inhumane conditions. Conduct-
ing research on the use of solitary conęnement on particular prisoners, for example,
might fulęll both requirements three and four as injustice could be uncovered and
publicized in order to raise awareness and appeal to the public conscience.
The aims of persuasion are three-fold. First, escapees aim to persuade the public
and policy makers that reform of the criminal justice system is necessary from stand-
points of both justice and eĜciency,39 thus pursuing legal change. Second, by commu-
37. See note 27 above.
38. Holdorf and Paterson, “PLANMounts Legal Responses...”
39. The justice aspect is obvious, but there is an eĜciency element as well since mass incarceration
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nicating that they intend no harm to anyone and will only use violence as a means of
avoiding being re-imprisoned, escapees aim to convince people that the typical con-
ception of convicts as inherently dangerous and malicious is not necessarily accurate.
This serves to break down the stereotypes of convicts that partially contribute to the
injustice of the mass incarceration system, or at least combat apathy to the injustice
and generate sympathy for escapees by publicizing their stories. Finally, meeting and
communicating with activists and journalists incurs a level of risk for escapees which
demonstrates that their escape is grounded in genuine concern for injustice and a de-
sire for change, rather than simply self-preservation.40
4 The pursuit of change: reform or abolition?
Activists and abolitionists will rightfully wonder whether the purpose of this frame-
work is to work towards the abolition of incarceration ormerely reform. I believe there
is some sense in which this distinction does not maĴer for this project. The justięcation
of prison breaks can be seen as a tool for either reform or abolition. Further, I’m of the
mindset that meaningful reform and total abolition must both begin with decarcera-
tion, for instance the decriminalization of non violent drug use and sexwork involving
consenting parties.41 Yet there is a danger in escapees and collaborators not specifying
their demands for change and choosing these demandswith care. Correctional author-
ities might appease escapees and collaborators by enacting minimal and incremental
changes that serve to perpetuate the Prison Industrial Complex rather than disman-
tle it. For example by increasing the size of solitary conęnement cells and decreasing
their overall use rather than simply eliminating the practice altogether. Or lawmakers
might reduce mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug use rather than decriminal-
izing it entirely. These are very real threats to both meaningful reform and abolition
alike, thus the targets of legal change should be chosen with care and communicated
explicitly.
There will necessarily be thought, discussion, and disagreement over what the ap-
propriate targets of change are or should be. I believe the obvious targets to consider
are the disproportionate powers of prosecutors over defendants, laws criminalizing
consensual and victimless acts, overcrowding, solitary conęnement, and the death
penalty. AĴempts at appeasement from authorities which fall short of eliminating
these injustices entirely are inadequate, and escapees and their collaborators should
not seĴle for such appeasement, as this will perpetuate rather than eliminate injustice.
Thus, rather than protesting injustice in general, there must be specięc targets and goals,
constitutes a hefty use of resources that could be used elsewhere. The diĜculty of former convicts to
procure employment is another issue of eĜciency perpetuated by mass incarceration.
40. I thank the reviewers at Aporia for raising this point.
41. It is obvious how this qualięes as reform, but Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, 107–11 identięes this as
an imperative of abolition as well.
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regardless of whether the ęnal aim is reform or abolition.
5 Conclusion
The proposal to classify certain instances of prison breaks as civil disobedience may
seem radical. Analogies of fugitive slave escapes42 and evasion of the Nazi regime
during WWII come to mind. Even though mass incarceration may not be as blatantly
unjust or as large in scale as these other examples I believe the injustice is suĜcient
to warrant civil disobedience. Although this framework is formulated with the U.S.
criminal justice system in mind, it is potentially applicable to other instances of incar-
ceration if they’re similarly unjust such as prisons in other countries, migrant detention
centers, or psychiatric wards.
There are likely many dimensions of this issue not suĜciently addressed here. For
example, what exactly makes a law unjust? Is it potentially possible for state pun-
ishment to be unjust yet still legitimate? And can escapees view the government in
general as legitimate while protesting against such large parts of it as prisons and the
criminal justice system? Clearly more analysis is necessary in order to cement the jus-
tięability of prison breaks as acts of civil disobedience. But by arguing against the
requirements of nonviolence and non evasiveness while fulęlling other requirements
such as persuasion, publicity, collaboration, and communication I believe I have pre-
sented a suĜcient case to begin the conversation.
References
Alexander, Michelle, and Cornel West. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness. The New Press, 2010.
American Civil Liberties Union. “Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the
United States.” 2015. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/
OverIncarceration/ACLU.pdf.
. “The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Conęnement in the United States.” 2014.
https://www.aclu.org/report/dangerous-overuse-solitary-confinement-
united-states.
Brownlee, Kimberley. Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience. Oxford
University Press, 2012.
42. Particularly keeping inmind that slavery is legal and constitutional as a form of punishment under
the 13th Amendment. For a thorough critical examination of this, see Ava DuVernay, dir., 13th (United
States: Kandoo Films, 2016).
26 Aporia VЂϿ. 19 NЂ. 2
Calavita, KiĴy. Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law.
2nd ed. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Celikates, Robin. “Rethinking Civil Disobedience as a Practice of Contestation—
Beyond the Liberal Paradigm.” Constellations 23, no. 1 (2016): 37–45.
Davis, Angela. Are Prisons Obsolete? Seven Stories Press, 2003.
Delmas, Candice.ADuty to Resist:WhenDisobedience Should BeUncivil. NewYork, USA:
Oxford University Press, 2018.
DuVernay, Ava, dir. 13th. United States: Kandoo Films, 2016.
Holdorf, Paul Stanley, and Melinda R. Paterson. “Prisoners’ Legal Advocacy Network
(PLAN)Mounts Legal Responses toWidespreadReports of PrisonerAbuses in the
Aftermath of the 2018 National Prison Strike.” 2018. https://www.nlg.org/plan-
prison-strike-response-2018/.
Hutchinson, Allan C. “Civil Disobedience: Its Logic and Language.” The Law Teacher
13, no. 1 (1979): 1–11.
King Jr., Martin Luther. “LeĴer from a Birmingham Jail.” 1963. https://www.africa.
upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
Morreall, John. “The Justięability of Violent Civil Disobedience.” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1976): 35–47.
Pfaě, John. Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—and How to Achieve Real
Reform. 2017.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. 1971. Reprint, Harvard University Press, 2005.
Smith, William. “Policing Civil Disobedience.” Political Studies 60, no. 4 (2012): 826–42.
Sonestein, David. “California Prisoners Say Videos Show ‘Gladiator Fights’ At Soledad
State Prison.” Shadow Proof, 2019. https://shadowproof.com/2019/02/18/cali
fornia-prisoners-say-videos-show-gladiator-fights-at-soledad-state-
prison/.
Walker, Jason Renard. “Grey Suit Protection: Ellis Unit Guards Admit Assaulting Pris-
oners, But Aren’t Held Accountable.” Incarcerated Workers Organizing CommiĴee,
2019. https://incarceratedworkers.org/news/grey-suit-protection-ellis-
unit-guards-admit-assaulting-prisoners-arent-held-accountable.
Zinn, Howard. “Law, Justice, and Disobedience.”Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and
Public Policy 5, no. 4 (1991): 899–920.
